I worry that the humanitarian community is on the wrong side of the Starlink debate. We bemoan Starlink bans across Africa and beyond. We treat every restriction as an attack on connectivity. Are we missing a deeper truth?
Governments have legitimate sovereignty concerns about satellite internet infrastructure that operates beyond their regulatory perimeter.
It is time to abandon the Silicon Valley narrative that connectivity is a “neutral good” that should flow unrestricted across borders? The evidence shows us something different: governments from Uganda to Papua New Guinea to Vietnam are asserting digital sovereignty over satellite communications for reasons that extend far beyond political control.
Instead of positioning ourselves against these restrictions, we should be working with governments to establish connectivity as properly governed critical digital infrastructure.
National Sovereignty Logic
Let me start with Uganda’s recent restrictions, as explained by a Uganda Revenue Authority memo requiring military clearance for all Starlink equipment imports. Opposition leader Bobi Wine predictably called this electoral mischief, but the timing near elections obscures a more fundamental governance issue that humanitarian actors need to understand.
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Uganda’s approach reflects what comprehensive policy analysis reveals across multiple countries: “Starlink bans” are better understood as assertions of telecom sovereignty, with governments applying existing tools to force LEO providers back inside national regulatory and security perimeters.
The dominant trigger isn’t spectrum scarcity, but what researchers call “governability” – LEO’s ability to deliver high-capacity connectivity without depending on national last-mile networks challenges states’ capacity to license and tax providers, enforce lawful interception, and operationalize content controls.
This isn’t about restricting technology for technology’s sake. These are legitimate governance responses to infrastructure that operates outside traditional regulatory frameworks.
The humanitarian sector’s reflexive opposition to these measures puts us on the wrong side of digital sovereignty principles that we claim to support. We cannot simultaneously advocate for local ownership and sustainable solutions while opposing governments’ attempts to maintain sovereignty over their digital infrastructure.
Repeating Digital Colonialism
This feels familiar because we’ve made this error before. The development community has a troubling pattern of championing technological solutions that actually deepen dependency on foreign systems. Now we’re doing it again with satellite internet.
When humanitarian organizations bypass government authorization for Starlink deployments, we’re essentially arguing that connectivity is so important that we can ignore national sovereignty. This is digital colonialism with good intentions – the same paternalistic logic that says we know what’s best for countries better than their own governments do.
The policy evidence shows governments understand exactly what’s at stake. Satellite internet represents what Vietnam’s regulations explicitly call connectivity that must be “domesticated” as critical infrastructure.
Countries are requiring local entities, local gateways, local storage, and security oversight not because they hate the internet, but because they recognize connectivity as a strategic capability that determines whether governments can respond to security threats, manage political legitimacy during contested periods, and protect domestic market structures.
Reducing Government Revenue
Let’s be honest about the economic dimensions. In many LMICs, telecom markets represent some of the few scalable sources of formal-sector revenue and regulatory control. Unrestricted satellite internet access can undermine government revenue streams.
Protecting state fiscal flows (license fees, universal service levies, taxation) from incumbent telecoms is essential national capacity building. Countries depend on telecom revenue as part of their governance infrastructure. Just look at the Kenyan government’s intervention into Safricom’s sale.
Treating the desire to regulate low earth orbit satellite internet providers as simple protectionism misses how digital telecommunication infrastructure intersects with state capacity in resource-constrained environments. Authorized deployments expanded via local partnerships, licensed resellers, and gateway arrangements preserve government oversight and revenue streams.
Sovereignty-Aligned Connectivity
Smart humanitarian organizations should be getting ahead of this trend rather than fighting it. The solution isn’t to oppose sovereignty frameworks but to work within them to promote connectivity as properly governed digital public infrastructure.
Here’s what good practice looks like in restricted environments:
- Legal Basis: Obtain written confirmation of authorization paths through licensed resellers, NGO import permits, or terminal type approval processes. Assume unauthorized use is illegal unless explicitly tolerated by host governments.
- Government Relations: Brief host governments early on why satellite redundancy supports humanitarian mandates – duty of care, medical referrals, logistics coordination. Frame deployments as supporting government capacity rather than bypassing it.
- Infrastructure Partnership: Be prepared for localization and gateway expectations, following Vietnam’s model of requiring traffic routing through domestic telecommunications networks. Align internal risk assessments with the possibility of increased surveillance obligations as part of operating within sovereign frameworks.
- Redundancy Planning: Design operations that don’t create single points of failure around any connectivity solution. Plan for potential service disablement, equipment confiscation, or forced handover during crisis periods.
Connectivity as Governed Infrastructure
The broader digital public infrastructure movement recognizes that connectivity must be treated as foundational infrastructure tied to sovereignty and national security.
We need to help governments build connectivity frameworks that balance openness with sovereignty, rather than forcing them to choose between the two. This means supporting regulatory capacity building, advocating for transparent licensing processes, and helping design oversight mechanisms that protect both connectivity and legitimate state interests.
When we work with rather than against sovereignty frameworks, we strengthen the very local ownership principles that effective development requires. The alternative – continuing to position satellite internet as a workaround to government control – ultimately undermines both connectivity goals and the state capacity that sustainable development depends on.
